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Abstract Internet-of-Things (IoT) enables the development of sharing econ-
omy applications. In many sharing economy scenarios, agents both produce as
well as consume a resource; we call them prosumers. A community of prosumers
agrees to sell excess resource to another community in a prosumer market. In
this chapter, we propose a control theoretic approach to regulate the number
of prosumers in a prosumer community, where each prosumer has a cost func-
tion that is coupled through its time-averaged production and consumption
of the resource. Furthermore, each prosumer runs its distributed algorithm
and takes only binary decisions in a probabilistic way, whether to produce one
unit of the resource or not and to consume one unit of the resource or not.
In the proposed approach, prosumers do not explicitly exchange information
with each other due to privacy reasons, but little exchange of information is
required for feedback signals, broadcast by a central agency. In the proposed
approach, prosumers achieve the optimal values asymptotically. Furthermore,
the proposed approach is suitable to implement in an IoT context with mini-
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mal demands on infrastructure. We describe two use cases; community-based
car sharing and collaborative energy storage for prosumer markets. We also
present simulation results to check the efficacy of the algorithms.
Keywords Distributed optimization · Internet-of-Things (IoT) · Optimal
control · Optimal allocation · Prosumers · Sharing economy · Prosumer
markets.
1 Introduction and Setting
Recently, consumers across a range of sectors have started to embrace shared
ownership of resources and services with guaranteed access, as opposed to
more traditional business models that focus on sole-ownership only. The rea-
sons for this trend are multi-faceted and range from societal issues, such as
the need to reduce wastage, and more general environmental concerns [1–4],
to pure monetary opportunities arising from increased connectivity (and the
ability that this gives to advertise the availability of unused resources and
services) [5]. Well-known examples of successful companies building sharing
economy products include Airbnb (hospitality), Lyft (ride sharing) [6], Bird
and Lime (scooter sharing), Mobike (bike sharing) [3], and Google (Google
reviews—information sharing).
Roughly speaking, several types of sharing application classes are discerned
(as described in [5]).
A. Opportunistic sharing: Services based on opportunistic sharing of re-
sources exploit large-scale availability of either unused resources or obsolete
business models or both. Examples of products in this area include the
parking application JustPark (www.justpark.com) and the peer-to-peer
car sharing services Getaround (www.getaround.com). The key enablers
for such products are mechanisms for informing agents of available re-
sources, their delivery, and payments.
B. Federated negotiation and sharing: Here, groups of agents come to-
gether to negotiate better contracts with utilities (electricity, gas, water,
health), or to provide mutually beneficial services such as collaborative
storage of energy. The key enablers for such products are mechanisms for
grouping communities and for enforcing contractual obligations for feder-
ations of like-minded consumers.
C. Bespoke sharing: In this case, products are designed with the specific
objective of being shared, rather than for sole ownership. A basic exam-
ple of such systems is devices and services that allow sharing of a single
electric charge-point by several users. Other examples include time-shared
apartments or cars that are owned by several people rather than a single
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person [5].
D. Hybrid sharing: Finally, opportunities also exist for sharing economy to
support the regular economy. We readily find examples of such systems
in the hospitality industry, where ad-hoc sharing economy infrastructure
(spare rooms in local houses) can be used as a buffer to accommodate ex-
cess demand in the regular economy (hotels).
The common characteristic in all of the above application classes is the ability
for community-wide communication and actuation, both to enable services to
be bought and sold, and so that contracts can be enforced.
The development of sharing economy applications [7, 8] is facilitated by
Internet-of-Things (IoT), for example, IoT helps to perform secure payments,
to track the location and the condition of an object, to list a few. Interested
readers can find several IoT-based applications in [9, 10] and the papers cited
therein. Therefore, while the value of the sharing economy is not in ques-
tion [2,11] and while many of the essential infrastructural elements needed for
the deployment of such systems are being developed rapidly, there is an addi-
tional requirement for structured platforms to enable distributed community-
wide buying and distributed community-wide selling. Currently, such platforms
are at a very early stage of development with significant opportunities for im-
provement.
Our objective in this chapter is to address this deficit partially and to de-
velop tools to support the design of community-based prosumer markets. We
define prosumers as agents that both produce and consume a resource [12].
Specifically, we are interested in developing light algorithms that can easily
be deployed on modest IoT platforms, and that can be used to support dis-
tributed community-wide buying and selling of resources. Here, by light, we
mean algorithms that place low demands on the infrastructure, both in terms
of computational power, and actuation and connectivity requirements of indi-
vidual prosumers. A fundamental requirement is also that such algorithms are
scale-free in the sense that they can operate across a range of community sizes;
from small communities of a few prosumers to larger communities made up of
very many prosumers. These constraints are directly related to the challenges
associated with uncertainties that arise in the context of sharing economy
problems. Typically, at any time instant, one does not know how many pro-
sumers are participating in the sharing scheme; whether prosumers can or
are willing to communicate with each other (perhaps due to privacy consid-
erations), and whether enough computational power is available to the whole
network to allocate resources in real-time optimally. A further complication
is that we would like any scheme that we develop to be backward compatible
with old IoT platforms that support only essential interaction between pro-
sumers and infrastructure. Thus, there is considerable interest in developing
4 Syed Eqbal Alam et al.
light algorithms that place only modest demands on infrastructure, yet can be
used to implement complex policies in the face of the uncertainties mentioned
above.
Given this context, we are particularly interested in situations where com-
munities come together to purchase and sell related commodities simultane-
ously. Such systems arise, for example, in energy systems where agents (pro-
sumers) both produce and consume energy [12–14].
2 Prosumer Markets and Communities
Prosumers are the agents that both produce and consume resources [12, 15].
We are interested in prosumer markets that facilitate a community of pro-
sumers for distributed production and consumption. Such markets are emerg-
ing rapidly in energy sector [16, 17], but also in other areas such as shared
mobility [18]. Parag and Sovacool [19] classify prosumer markets according to
three network architectures 1.
(i) Prosumer-to-prosumer model: In this peer-to-peer model, prosumers inter-
act (buy or sell resource) directly with each other as depicted in Figure 1.
This model is widespread. For example, consider the case of car sharing
platform Turo. Here, car owners list their cars on Turo sharing platform,
and the riders book the cars of their choice through this platform for a
certain period with a fee. A similar, peer-to-peer model is proposed in [20]
for energy trading in microgrids.
p
p
p
pp
pp
Fig. 1: Prosumer-to-prosumer model. Here p represents a prosumer. Figure
adapted from [19].
1 In the network architectures, p represents a prosumer.
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(ii) Prosumer-to-firm model: In this model, prosumers interact with a local
firm directly. There are two types of prosumer to firm models, prosumer-
to-interconnected-firm model, and prosumer-to-isolated-firm model. In the
prosumer-to-interconnected-firm model, prosumers are connected to a lo-
cal firm, which may be connected to the main firm as presented in Figure
2(a). For example, suppose that prosumers produce energy from renewable
sources and are connected to a microgrid. A prosumer satisfies its energy
needs from the microgrid and the energy it produces. If the prosumer pro-
duces more energy than it needs; then, it can return excess energy to the
microgrid, this microgrid may be connected to the main grid. Whereas, in
the prosumer-to-isolated-firm model, prosumers are connected to the lo-
cal firm, which works in isolation as depicted in Figure 2(b). Example of
the prosumer-to-isolated-firm model is Island microgrid [21] in which pro-
sumers and microgrid work together to fulfill the energy need of prosumers
in the Island.
firm
firm
p
p
p
p
p
p
p
p
(a)
firm
firm
p
p
p
p
p
p
p
p
(b)
Fig. 2: Prosumer-to-firm models—(a) prosumer-to-interconnected-firm model,
and (b) prosumer-to-isolated-firm model. Figure adapted from [19].
(iii) Community-based prosumer model: In this model, prosumers are located in
the same geographic location who have similar resource needs and resource
production pattern; more generally, they share common goals and interests.
These prosumers are grouped to interact with each other and efficiently
manage the resource needs of the community, as depicted in Figure 3. In
this case, communities may also exchange resources with each other. A
recent example of community-based trip sharing is found at [22] in which
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the algorithm clusters commuters in communities to optimize car usage.
We clarify that, for simplicity, we consider a single prosumer community
that interacts with another community (external community) in the rest of
the chapter unless otherwise stated.
Community1
p
p
p
p
p
Community3
p
p
p
p
p
p
pp
p
Community2
Fig. 3: Community-based prosumer model. Figure adapted from [19].
While work on analytics to help design prosumer markets is still in its in-
fancy, somewhat surprisingly few papers have begun to deal with some of the
complex market design issues associated with such systems [13], [23], [24], [25].
Roughly speaking, these papers deal with two main issues; (i) the existence
of market equilibria, and (ii) methods to allocate resources amongst (compet-
ing) prosumers. It is in this latter context that this present work is placed.
Generally speaking, resource allocation algorithms for prosumer markets have
until now been formulated in an optimization context and can be categorized
as is traditionally done for classical optimization models. Namely, resources
are either allocated centrally [26] as in the case of Uber, whereby drivers are
assigned to the passengers; or in a distributed fashion as in the case of Airbnb,
whereby guests and hosts choose each other; or using hybrid of the above two,
as in the case of Didi Chuxing [1]. As we have said, typically, these allocation
problems are formulated in an optimization context, paying particular atten-
tion to the certain constraints that arise in the sharing economy. These include
privacy of the individual, fair allocation of resources, the satisfaction of service
level agreements, and ever-increasing regulatory constraints (for example, in
the case of Airbnb).
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Our contribution in this chapter is to address these problems using a differ-
ent approach. Namely, we shall consider these problems (in a control theoretic
context) as regulation problems with optimality constraints. In particular, we
are interested in applications where prosumer communities both buy and sell
resources from or to one, or more external entities. Thus, we take the view that
such communities have a contract to both buy and sell a pre-specified level of a
resource at a given time instant, and the objective of the allocation algorithm
is to ensure that these levels of demand are met. Given this basic setting, we
ask the question as to whether this can be done without any explicit exchange
of information between individual prosumers in situations where prosumers
take only binary decisions (buy or sell), and whether given these constraints,
optimal use of the resource can be realized. We shall see in the next section
that it is indeed possible to formulate the problem and develop distributed
algorithms that achieve all of these properties, and which can be implemented
in an IoT context with minimal demands on infrastructure.
2.1 Prior Work
Recent analytics work on sharing economy has primarily followed two direc-
tions; (i) market design and equilibria, and (ii) optimal allocation of resources.
Here, we give a very brief picture of some of the most recent work. In [25],
Georgiadis et al. propose three types of resource allocation mechanisms; cen-
tralized, coalition-based (game-theoretic approach), and peer-to-peer. In [23],
Gkatzikis et al. propose a collaborative consumption mechanism to minimize
the electricity cost of a community, and in [27], Tushar et al. developed a game-
theoretic model for peer-to-peer energy trading. Furthermore, in [13], Moret et
al. design a community-based distributed energy collective market model that
helps energy prosumers to optimize their energy resources and to achieve social
welfare of the community. More recently, Iosifidis and Tassiulas [24], propose
optimization techniques for resource exchange and production scheduling for
cooperative systems. Courcoubetis and Weber [28], propose mechanisms for
the optimal allocation of shared computing resources. In [22], Hasan et al.
propose a community-based car sharing model to maximize the trip sharing.
To do so, they use mixed-integer programming, graph theory, and clustering
techniques. In [20], Zhang et al. propose a game theoretic peer-to-peer en-
ergy trading model between local prosumers and distributed energy resources.
They show that the model gives rise to an equilibrium between energy produc-
tion and consumption. In addition to these works, a peer-to-peer equilibrium
model for collaborative consumption is proposed by Benjaafar et al. in [29].
Finally, Grijalva et al. [18], discuss architecture for prosumer-based distributed
control for the electricity grid. We refer interested readers to a recent review
paper by Sousa et al., which covers market design, optimization techniques,
and interesting future directions at [30].
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2.2 Contribution
We are primarily interested in applications where prosumer communities buy
and sell resources via contracts to one or more external entities and must
ensure that they meet certain demands in real-time. Thus, the objective of
any allocation algorithm is to ensure that these levels of demand are met.
Typically, a problem of this nature would be solved in a standard optimiza-
tion framework. Unfortunately, this approach is not available to us due to the
uncertainty that prevails for this system class. For example, the number of
prosumers participating at a given time instant may vary, as may the con-
tracted level of prosumption. Also, for reasons of privacy, prosumers may only
communicate with each other or with the infrastructure in a limited fashion,
making the communication graph unknown a-priori, from the point of view
of algorithm development. Thus, our approach is to formulate these allocation
problems in a control theoretic setting, where the effect of these uncertain-
ties and other disturbances can be dealt with using feedback. Our principal
contribution is, therefore, to develop distributed control algorithms that can
asymptotically achieve optimality.
3 Problem Statement
Let us assume that a prosumer market consists of a prosumer community and
an external community. The prosumer community has N ∈ N prosumers pro-
ducing and consuming a resource, which agrees to sell its excess resource to the
external community. We also assume that the prosumer market has a control
unit, which measures the aggregate consumption and production of the re-
source. It communicates with the prosumer community as well as the external
community; we call it a sharing platform. Additionally, notice that N is not
known to the individual prosumers participating in the scheme. For simplicity,
we assume that there is a single resource produced and consumed by all pro-
sumers, though our formulation can easily be extended to multiple resources
and multiple prosumer communities. In our model, the process of production
and consumption takes place at discrete time instants t0 < t1 < t2 < . . .,
where t0 = 0. At each time instant, the overall production and consumption
of the previous time instant are evaluated and adjusted. Additionally, we as-
sume that communities and external agencies are contracted to, on aggregate,
consume and produce a certain amount of the resource at time instant tk, for
k = 0, 1, 2, . . .
We assume that each prosumer has limited actuation and at any time in-
stant tk, for k = 0, 1, 2, . . ., either it consumes one unit of the resource or it
does not consume it. Similarly, each prosumer either produces one unit of the
resource at a time instant or it does not produce it. Thus, for each prosumer
i, we denote by xi(k) the amount of the resource consumed, and by yi(k) the
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amount of the resource produced at time instant tk.
2
We also assume that there are constants Cx ≥ 0 and Cy ≥ 0, specifying the
aggregate consumption and production bounds. Notice that the constants Cx
and Cy are known to the sharing platform, but not to individual prosumers in
the market. Thus, at each time instant tk, we require:
N∑
i=1
xi(k) = Cx, and, (1)
N∑
i=1
yi(k) = Cy. (2)
Our primary objective is to ensure that these prosumption bounds are met
at each time instant tk, for k = 0, 1, 2, . . . However, we are particularly inter-
ested in situations where production and consumption are coupled together.
For example, in communities that are formed to produce energy, the time-
averaged production and consumption of energy might be coupled through
battery storage requirements. Furthermore, in the community-based car shar-
ing prosumer market, the average number of delivered and received “cars”
might be coupled through the desired value of utilization of cars; and sim-
ilarly, production of a resource might depend on its consumption. Thus, in
these situations, we would like to ensure that consumption and production
bounds (1) and (2) are met asymptotically. To formulate this as a long-term
requirement, we introduce the time-averaged consumption:
xi(k) ,
1
k + 1
k∑
`=0
xi(`), for i = 1, . . . , N, (3)
with the time-averaged production yi(k) defined analogously. Now, let Ti ∈ R+
be the desired value of utilization of the resource, for i = 1, . . . , N . Thus,
depending on the application (refer Section 5, cf. (25)), we might require:
lim
k→∞
xi(k) + yi(k) = Ti, for i = 1, . . . , N, (4)
with some additional constraints on xi(k) and yi(k). In several applications,
we might require for αi ∈ [0, 1]:
lim
k→∞
xi(k) = αiTi, and, lim
k→∞
yi(k) = (1− αi)Ti, for i = 1, . . . , N. (5)
Fortunately, in problems that we consider, there is flexibility in satisfying these
constraints and it is enough to satisfy that for sufficiently large k, we have:
xi(k) + yi(k) ≈ Ti, and, (6)
2 Depending on the application, the processes of production and consumption may be
more appropriately modeled on a continuous time-scale. In this case, we interpret time
instants tk at those times in which the prosumption over the interval (tk−1, tk] is accounted
for.
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xi(k) ≈ αiTi, and, yi(k) ≈ (1− αi)Ti, (7)
for i = 1, . . . , N . To formulate this mathematically, we associate a cost gi :
(0, 1]2 → R+, (xi, yi) 7→ gi(xi, yi) to the deviation of the actual long-term
prosumptions.
Assumption 1 (Cost function) The cost function gi(·) is strictly convex,
strictly increasing in each variable, and is continuously differentiable, for all
i.
Given this basic setting, we are interested in solving the following opti-
mization problem:
Problem 1 (Optimization)
min
ξ1,...,ξN ,η1,...,ηN
N∑
i=1
gi(ξi, ηi), (8)
subject to
N∑
i=1
ξi = Cx, (9)
N∑
i=1
ηi = Cy, (10)
ξi ≥ 0, (11)
ηi ≥ 0, for i = 1, 2, . . . , N. (12)
We assume that for this optimization problem an optimal point (ξ∗, η∗) ∈ R2N+
exists. The optimal point is unique by Assumption 1 of strict convexity of the
cost function gi(·). As our problem is timed, we aim to design a distributed
algorithm determining, for each time instant tk, values of xi(k) and yi(k), such
that for the long-term averages, we have:
lim
k→∞
xi(k) = ξ
∗
i , lim
k→∞
yi(k) = η
∗
i , for i = 1, . . . , N. (13)
Also, it is desirable that the constraints of the optimization problem are satis-
fied by xi(k), yi(k), for every k, where xi(k) takes the role of the optimization
variable ξi and yi(k) that of ηi.
Typically, a problem of this nature can be solved in a standard optimiza-
tion framework. Unfortunately, this approach is not available to us for many
reasons:
(i) The number of prosumers N in the prosumer community, and the con-
straints Cx and Cy may vary with time, making an offline computation of
an optimal solution difficult.
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(ii) To preserve privacy, we also assume that prosumers do not necessarily
communicate with each other, and they only communicate with the in-
frastructure in a limited fashion. Thus, even the communication graph is
unknown a-priori for this particular problem class. In particular, individ-
ual cost function gi is often private and is not shared by prosumers.
(iii) We are interested in algorithms that self organize and converge to an op-
timal solution even in the presence of disturbances in the state information.
Our approach, therefore, is to treat the above problem as a feedback
(stochastic) control problem, which changes the formulation in a minor way;
namely, we allow:
N∑
i=1
xi(k) ≈ Cx, and
N∑
i=1
yi(k) ≈ Cy, for all k. (14)
In other words, we allow the instantaneous prosumption to undershoot or
overshoot the reference values by a small amount. Then, given this background,
and from Assumption 1 for the cost function gi, for all prosumers i, we shall
demonstrate that an elementary feedback control algorithm can be devised to
solve an approximate version of Problem 1. As we shall see, this algorithm
requires only a few bits of message transfer as intermittent feedback from a
control unit (sharing platform) to prosumers in the prosumer market, but no
inter-prosumer communication is required.
4 Algorithms for Community-based Prosumer Markets
The algorithms proposed in this section are motivated by the following ele-
mentary argument. We consider only the case in which at time instant tk,
either 0 or 1 unit of the resource is consumed or produced, for k = 0, 1, 2, . . .
For the sake of argument, we only consider the case of pure consumption in
this preamble.
Let z(k) denote the number of times an agent (consumer) consumes a
unit resource until time instant tk, where k = 0, 1, 2, . . . Let z(k) , 1k+1z(k),
denote the time-averaged consumption of the resource until time instant tk.
We assume that the consumption at time instant tk is decided by a stochastic
procedure, where the probability of consumption of one unit of the resource is
a function p(z(k)). Additionally, we assume that this probability conditioned
on z(k) is independent of the previous history of the process. Then:
z(k + 1) = z(k) + w(k), (15)
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where w(k) is a random variable taking the value 0 or 1. Thus, the following
holds true:
z(k + 1) =
k + 1
k + 2
z(k) +
1
k + 2
w(k) (16)
= z(k) +
1
k + 2
(
w(k)− z(k)). (17)
Recall that p(z(k)) denotes the probability that w(k) = 1 at time instant tk,
for k = 0, 1, 2, . . . Then, we rewrite (17) as:
z(k + 1) = z(k) +
1
k + 2
(
p(z(k))− z(k))+ 1
k + 2
(
w(k)− p(z(k))).
Note that systems of this form are discussed extensively in [31]. In particular,
the term 1k+2
(
w(k)−p(z(k))) is a martingale difference sequence and is treated
as noise. It is shown in [31] that under mild assumptions, z(k) converges al-
most surely. The basic idea of the remainder of this section is to construct
stochastic feedback algorithms that mimic this argument. In particular, our
basic idea in the sequel is to choose the probability distribution p(z(k)), so that
the stochastic system both solves a regulation problem and also optimization
problem of the form of Problem 1, simultaneously.
4.1 Optimality Conditions
In this subsection, we briefly discuss the optimality conditions for Problem
1, using Lagrangian multipliers. These optimality conditions lead to the state
dependent probabilities that we alluded to in the preamble.
Let x = (x1, x2, . . . , xN ) and y = (y1, y2, . . . , yN ). Also, let µ
1, µ2 and λ1 =
(λ11, . . . , λ
1
N ), λ
2 = (λ21, . . . , λ
2
N ) be the Lagrange multipliers corresponding
to the equality constraints (9), (10) and the inequality constraints (11), (12),
respectively. The Lagrangian of Problem 1 is defined as L : R2N×R2×R2N →
R, where
L(x, y, µ1, µ2, λ1, λ2) =
N∑
i=1
gi(xi, yi)− µ1(
N∑
i=1
xi − Cx)− µ2(
N∑
i=1
yi − Cy)
+
N∑
i=1
λ1ixi +
N∑
i=1
λ2i yi.
We assume that the optimal value of Problem 1 is obtained for positive values
of consumption and production. We, therefore, let x∗i , y
∗
i ∈ (0, 1] denote the
optimal point of Problem 1. By this assumption, the inequality constraints are
not active, and it follows that the corresponding optimal Lagrange multipliers
are λ∗1 = 0 = λ∗2.
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Additionally, let µ∗1, µ∗2 be the optimal Lagrange multipliers for the equal-
ity constraints. The first order optimality condition is that the gradient van-
ishes, and inspection shows that the gradient condition decouples. Recall that
∇xgi(.) denotes the partial derivative of gi(.) with respect to xi and ∇ygi(.)
denotes the partial derivative of gi(.) with respect yi. Then, we arrive at the
following conditions:
∇xgi(x∗i , y∗i ) = µ∗1, for i = 1, 2, . . . , N,
and,
∇ygi(x∗i , y∗i ) = µ∗2, for i = 1, 2, . . . , N.
In other words, we have:
∇xgi(x∗i , y∗i ) = ∇xgj(x∗j , y∗j ), for i, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}. (18)
The same consensus condition holds for ∇ygi(x∗i , y∗i ), i = 1, . . . , N . We find
that the optimal values satisfy all the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions,
which are necessary and sufficient conditions for optimality of differentiable
convex functions (Chap. 5.5.3 [32]). Hence, the derivatives of the cost func-
tions of all prosumers with respect to consumption as well as production must
reach consensus at the optimal point.
This type of consensus condition has been used in [33, 34] (single resource
case) and [35] (multi-resource case) to derive place-dependent probabilities
that ensure convergence to the consensus condition and thus, to the optimal
point.
4.2 Algorithm for Consumption
Here, we briefly describe the distributed algorithm proposed in [34] for allo-
cating a single resource to consumers. In this model, no production is taking
place, hence the corresponding variables are omitted. Suppose that there are
N consumers in a community. We assume that consumer i of the community
has a cost function gi : (0, 1] → R+, which is strictly convex, strictly increas-
ing in each variable, and continuously differentiable, for i = 1, 2, . . . , N . The
random variable xi(k) ∈ {0, 1} denotes the consumption of the unit resource
for consumer i at time instant tk, for all i and k. As before, let xi(k) be the
time-averaged consumption of consumer i until time instant tk, for all i and
k.
The idea is to choose probabilities so as to ensure convergence to the social
optimum and to adjust overall consumption by the community to the reference
value (capacity) Cx, by applying a feedback signal Ω(k) to the probabilities.
At each time instant tk, the control unit updates Ω(k) using a gain parameter
τ > 0, the past aggregate consumption of the resource, and the capacity Cx
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as described in (19) and then, broadcasts the new value to all consumers in
the community:
Ω(k + 1) , Ω(k)− τ
( N∑
i=1
xi(k)− Cx
)
. (19)
After receiving this signal, consumer i responds in a probabilistic way. The
probability distribution σi(·) is calculated using the time-averaged consump-
tion xi(k) and the derivative g
′
i(·) of the cost function gi(·), as follows:
σi(Ω(k), xi(k)) , Ω(k)
xi(k)
g′i(xi(k))
. (20)
Notice that the cost function gi is chosen as increasing function in each variable
so that the probability σi(·) is in the valid range, for all i. Now, consumer i
updates its resource consumption at each time instant tk, either by consuming
one unit of the resource or not consuming it, as follows:
xi(k + 1) =
{
1 with probability σi(Ω(k), xi(k));
0 with probability 1− σi(Ω(k), xi(k)).
Empirical results show that the time-averaged consumption xi(k) converges
to the optimal value x∗i asymptotically.
Remark 1 (Integral control action) Equation (19) defines what is called an
integral control action in tracking control. The overall consumption by the
community should “track” the available capacity, i.e., approximate it. In other
words, the objective of the integrator is to ensure that the tracking error
e(k) =
∑N
i=1 xi(k)− Cx ≈ 0 asymptotically.
Remark 2 (Consensus of derivatives) The policy for σi(Ω(k), xi(k)) in (20)
is to ensure that asymptotically, g′i(xi(k)) = g
′
j(xj(k)), for all consumers i
and j. As is discussed in [34], the convergence of the above algorithm and
strict convexity of all cost functions (and of course assuming the existence of
a feasible solution in the constraint set) is enough to imply that Problem 1 is
solved asymptotically for the consumption case.
4.3 Algorithm for Coupled Prosumption
The case of coupled prosumption of a single resource is characterized by the
constraint (4), that is, consumption and production are coupled through the
desired value of utilization of the resource. The algorithm follows the case of
exclusive consumption closely taking into account the cost function as dis-
cussed in the problem formulation (Section 3). Before proceeding, note that
the following discussion extends to an arbitrary number of resources, but is
presented for a single resource, both to aid exposition and to be consistent
with the application class that is the principal consideration in this chapter.
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Interested readers can look at [36] for preliminary results on multi-resource
allocation. With this background in mind, following the discussion for con-
sumption, let us assume that in a prosumer market there is a community of N
prosumers. The prosumer community sells the excess resource to an external
community. Furthermore, let τx, τy denote the gain parameters for consump-
tion and production, Ωx(k), Ωy(k) denote the feedback signals for both pro-
cesses, and Cx, Cy represent the respective contract (capacity) constraints.
We assume the existence of a centralized control unit (sharing platform) in
the prosumer market that can measure the aggregate response of the pro-
sumer community and broadcast a feedback signal in the prosumer market at
each time instant tk, for both consumption and production type. Specifically,
the sharing platform updates the feedback signal Ωx(k), as follows:
Ωx(k + 1) , Ωx(k)− τx
( N∑
i=1
xi(k)− Cx
)
, for all k, (21)
with Ωy(k) updated analogously. After receiving a feedback signal prosumer i’s
algorithm responds in a probabilistic manner. The probability that prosumer
i responds to the feedback signal is given by:
σi,x(k) , Ωx(k)
∇xgi
(
xi(k), yi(k)
)
xi(k)
, for all i and k. (22)
Here, σi,x(k) denotes the probability of prosumer i, responding to a demand
for consumption of the resource, at time instant tk; similarly, σi,y(k) denotes
the probability of prosumer i, responding for production of the resource at
time instant tk, for all k. As in the consumption case, the cost function gi is
chosen as increasing function in each variable, to keep the probabilities σi,x(k)
and σi,y(k) in the valid range. However, the definition of σi,x(k) and σi,y(k)
is slightly different from the consumption case, described previously. Now,
prosumer i updates its consumption and production of the resource at each
time instant in the following way:
xi(k + 1) =
{
1 with probability σi,x(k);
0 with probability 1− σi,x(k), and,
yi(k + 1) =
{
1 with probability σi,y(k);
0 with probability 1− σi,y(k),
for all i and k. Empirically, we observe that the time-averaged consump-
tion xi(k) converges to the optimal consumption value x
∗
i , and similarly, the
time-averaged production yi(k) converges to the optimal production value y
∗
i
asymptotically, for all prosumers in the community. We describe the algorithm
of the sharing platform in Algorithm 1 and the algorithm of prosumers of the
community in Algorithm 2. We make the following remarks.
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Remark 3 (Communication overhead and privacy) There is no explicit com-
munication between prosumers. Thus, the algorithm is low cost in terms of
communication and is private.
Remark 4 (Probability bounds) The gain parameters τx, τy are small constants
chosen to ensure σi,x(k) and σi,y(k) are the probabilities; namely, are in [0,1],
for all i and k.
Remark 5 (Consensus of partial derivatives) The well-posedness of our algo-
rithm follows from the assumption of strict convexity of gi(·), and that the con-
straint sets are closed and bounded; namely, that there exists unique optimal
solutions to Problem 1. To show that the long-term average values converge
to the optimal values, we use the consensus of (partial) derivatives of the cost
functions of prosumers as described previously. That is:
lim
k→∞
∇xgi(xi(k), yi(k)) = lim
k→∞
∇xgj(xj(k), yj(k)),
and similarly,
lim
k→∞
∇ygi(xi(k), yi(k)) = lim
k→∞
∇ygj(xj(k), yj(k)),
for all i, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}.
Algorithm 1: Algorithm of control unit (sharing platform).
1 Input: Cx, Cy , τx, τy , xi(k), yi(k), for k = 0, 1, 2, . . . and i = 1, 2, . . . , N .
2 Output: Ωx(k + 1), Ωy(k + 1), for k = 0, 1, 2, . . .
3 Initialization: Ωx(0)← 0.06 and Ωy(0)← 0.061,
4 foreach k = 0, 1, 2, . . . do
5 calculate Ωx(k + 1) and Ωy(k + 1) as follows and broadcast them in the
prosumer community;
Ωx(k + 1)← Ωx(k)− τx
( N∑
i=1
xi(k)− Cx
)
, and,
Ωy(k + 1)← Ωy(k)− τy
( N∑
i=1
yi(k)− Cy
)
.
6 end
5 Use Cases
We now describe two use cases for community-based prosumer market. The
first is a transportation example and concerns a car sharing prosumer mar-
ket. The second example is from the energy sector and considers a prosumer
market, where produced and consumed energy is coupled through storage con-
straints.
1 We initialize Ωx(0) and Ωy(0) with positive real numbers.
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Algorithm 2: Algorithm of prosumer i.
1 Input: Ωx(k), Ωy(k), for k = 0, 1, 2, . . .
2 Output: xi(k + 1), yi(k + 1), for k = 0, 1, 2, . . .
3 Initialization: xi(0), yi(0)← 1 and xi(0)← xi(0) and yi(0)← yi(0).
4 while prosumer i is active at k = 0, 1, 2, . . . do
5
σi,x(k)← Ωx(k)
∇xgi
(
xi(k), yi(k)
)
xi(k)
;
σi,y(k)← Ωy(k)
∇ygi
(
xi(k), yi(k)
)
yi(k)
;
calculate outcome of the random variables;
xi(k + 1)←
{
1 w. p. σi,x(k)
0 w. p. 1− σi,x(k);
yi(k + 1)←
{
1 w. p. σi,y(k)
0 w. p. 1− σi,y(k);
update xi(k + 1) and yi(k + 1) as follows;
xi(k + 1)←k + 1
k + 2
xi(k) +
1
k + 2
xi(k + 1);
yi(k + 1)←
k + 1
k + 2
yi(k) +
1
k + 2
yi(k + 1);
6 end
5.1 Community-based Car Sharing
In this use case, we consider a community of N households (prosumers) with
several cars, not all of which are required each day. We assume that cars are
pooled and shared amongst community members to multiplex and monetize
the excess capacity, but that the average aggregate daily community demand
for cars is known. We let Ti denote the average number of cars desired to be
used by each household i, for all i. Suppose that Cx cars are required within
the community each day, and an excess of Cy cars are made available to an
external community each day. For simplicity, we assume that Cx and Cy are
fixed. Notice that a household is a prosumer in the sense that it requires
cars for its transportation needs and supplies excess car-days to an external
community. For each prosumer i, let xi(k) ∈ {0, 1} denote that prosumer i
requires a car at day k or not, and let yi(k) ∈ {0, 1} denote that prosumer
i supplies a car to an external community at day k or not. Thus, we assume
that aggregated over the entire community, the demand for shared cars on a
given day k is:
N∑
i=1
xi(k) = Cx, (23)
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leaving the excess capacity so that Cy cars can be supplied to an external
community:
N∑
i=1
yi(k) = Cy. (24)
Thus,
∑k
`=0 xi(`) is the number of days a car was required by prosumer
i over k days, and
∑k
`=0 yi(`) is the number of days that the same prosumer
made a car available to an external community. Thus,
∑k
`=0
(
xi(`) + yi(`)
)
is the total number of days that a car was used as a result of prosumer i.
Over some days, prosumer i will require that the time-averaged of this num-
ber be equal to the desired value of utilization of cars, Ti. For example, if a
prosumer has two cars, thus, over seven days period (a week) it has 14 car-
days. Now, suppose that the prosumer only needs access to 10 car-days over a
week. Then, this prosumer might choose
∑6
`=0 xi(`) and
∑6
`=0 yi(`), such that∑6
`=0
(
xi(`) +yi(`)
)
= 12. In this case, the prosumer sells access to two excess
car-days over the week (two car-days rather than the maximum of four to
provide some margin in case that a car is required for personal use more than
expected). Let xi(k) denote the average number of days prosumer i requires a
car over k days, and let yi(k) denote the average number of days prosumer i
makes a car available to an external community over k days, for all i and k.
Thus, over a long period, this constraint can be scaled by the number of days
to yield:
xi(k) + yi(k) ≈ Ti, (25)
with the cost of not achieving this goal captured by a penalty function gi(xi+
yi − Ti). For sufficiently large k, we might also require that xi(k) ≈ αiTi
and yi(k) ≈ (1− αi)Ti with αi ∈ [0, 1], for all i. This latter constraint can be
formulated in terms of a cost via a penalty function. For example, in residential
areas in Ireland; two car households are common, meaning that households
can in principle both consume and produce cars simultaneously, hence act
as prosumers. However, this may not always be possible, and prosumers may
be required to make alternative arrangements or pay penalties, should they
not be able to meet contractual demands. To formulate the cost function, we
associate costs hi : (0, 1] → R+, xi 7→ hi(xi) to the deviation from αiTi and
li : (0, 1] → R+, yi 7→ li(yi) to the deviation from (1 − αi)Ti, for all i. Then,
the aim of the sharing platform is to minimize:
N∑
i=1
(
gi(xi + yi − Ti) + hi(xi − αiTi) + li(yi − (1− αi)Ti)
)
, (26)
subject to the additional constraints listed in Problem 1.
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5.2 Collaborative Energy Storage
In this use case, we again assume that there are N households in a community
participating in a prosumer market, with each household connected to the grid,
and also has installed solar panels. Every household has batteries to store the
energy either from the solar panel or the grid. The households act as prosumers
in the sense that they can consume stored energy as well as sell excess energy
for monetary benefits. Let xi(k) ∈ {0, 1} denote that household i consumes
stored energy at day k or not, and let yi(k) ∈ {0, 1} denote that household i
sells stored energy to an external community at day k or not, for all i. Let xi(k)
denote the time-averaged amount of stored energy consumed by household i
over k days, and let yi(k) denote the time-averaged amount of stored energy
sold by household i to an external community over k days, for all i. Now,
we assume that
∑N
i=1 xi(k) = Cx, be the aggregated consumption of stored
energy over the entire community on a given day k; whereas, the excess energy
Cy is sold to an external community, with
∑N
i=1 yi(k) = Cy. Furthermore, we
assume that each household may have a constraint on the amount of energy
stored in order to realize the above strategy. As in the previous use case, this
soft constraint is captured as follows. Let Ti be the desired amount of energy
stored by household i. Then, on average, over a sufficiently large given period
k, household i may expect to store the following desired amount of energy
temporarily:
xi(k) + yi(k) ≈ Ti, (27)
with the deviation from this goal captured by a penalty function gi(xi+yi−Ti).
We might also require that roughly speaking, a certain amount of storage is
reserved for consumption and a certain amount to sell (production). Hence,
again, the objective of the sharing platform is to minimize:
N∑
i=1
(
gi(xi + yi − Ti) + hi(xi − αiTi) + li(yi − (1− αi)Ti)
)
,
subject to the constraints listed in Problem 1. Notice that the definition of
hi(·) and li(·) is same as the previous use case.
6 Simulation Results
In this section, we present simulation results for 99 prosumers participating in
a prosumer market. We assume that these N = 99 in the prosumer market are
grouped into two prosumer communities. Prosumers 1 to 50 are grouped in
Community 1, and Prosumers 51 to 99 are grouped in Community 2. Addition-
ally, each community has a cost function type, and prosumers of a particular
community use the cost function type of that community, but with random-
ized parameter values. Recall that prosumers can produce the resource as well
as consume it. Let time instants t0 < t1 < t2 < . . ., represent days, and let
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the capacity constraints be Cx = 90 and Cy = 80. Furthermore, let the cost
factors ai ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 10} and bi ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 15} be drawn from uniformly dis-
tributed random variables. Additionally, let δ = 11.75 and γ = 11.65. Notice
that the values of δ and γ are chosen in such a way that the cost function gi(·)
is increasing in each variable. Recall that this is done to keep the probabilities
σi,x and σi,y in [0, 1]. The cost functions are presented as follows:
gi(xi(k), yi(k)) =

δ
(
xi(k) + yi(k)
)
+ 14ai
(
xi(k) + yi(k)− T1
)2
+
1
2
(
xi(k)− 12T1
)2
+ 12
(
yi(k)− 12T1
)2
Community 1,
γ
(
xi(k) + yi(k)
)
+ 18ai
(
xi(k) + yi(k)− T2
)2
+
5
4bi
(
xi(k) + yi(k)− T2
)4
+ 12
(
xi(k)− 12T2
)2
+
1
2
(
yi(k)− 12T2
)2
Community 2.
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Fig. 4: (a) Evolution of time-averaged consumption of the resource, and (b)
evolution of time-averaged production of the resource.
Now, we present the simulation results and show the convergence of the
long-term average of prosumption by each prosumer in Figure 4. Figure 4(a)
shows the time-averaged consumption and Figure 4(b) shows the time-averaged
production over 200 days. In the context of car sharing, these are the aver-
age of cars used by a prosumer and the average of cars shared with another
person by the same prosumer over 200 days, respectively. Figure 5 illustrates
the average prosumption on the 200th day by every prosumer of a particular
community. Furthermore, the absolute difference between the desired value of
utilization Ti of cars and the actual utilization xi(k) + yi(k) by prosumer i for
a certain period is shown in Figure 6. Figure 6(a) illustrates the evolution of
the absolute difference between Ti and xi(k) + yi(k) for individual prosumers.
Here, we observe that gradually the difference comes closer to zero. Addition-
ally, in Figure 6(b) and 6(c), we observe that the absolute difference between
the quantities is close to zero for most of the prosumers.
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Fig. 5: At time index K = 200—(a) average consumption xi(K) by prosumers
of Community 1, (b) average consumption xi(K) by prosumers of Community
2, (c) average production yi(K) by prosumers of Community 1, and (d) average
production yi(K) by prosumers of Community 2.
Now, we analyze the derivatives of the cost functions and see, whether they
gather close to each other to make consensus over time or not. Recall that the
derivative of the cost function with respect to consumption is ∇xgi(.) and with
respect to production is ∇ygi(.), that are shown in Figure 7 for a single simu-
lation. We plot the shaded errorbars as depicted in Figure 7(a) and 7(b). It is
observed that in both the cases the derivatives gather close to each other over
time. Therefore, we say that the derivatives make consensus asymptotically in
their respective prosumer communities, which is a necessary and sufficient con-
dition for optimality as described in Subsection 4.1. Notice that because both
the derivatives (with respect to consumption and production) are same, there-
fore, we illustrate here just one of them. We clarify here that because of the
chosen initial values, the probability σi,x(k) may overshoot at the start of the
algorithm; to keep it in the valid range, we use min
{
1, Ωx(k)
∇xgi
(
xi(k),yi(k)
)
xi(k)
}
.
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Fig. 6: (a) Evolution of absolute difference between desired value of utilization
Ti and actual utilization of the resource xi(k) + yi(k) of individual prosumers,
(b) absolute difference between desired value of utilization and actual utiliza-
tion |xi(K) + yi(K)− T1| of prosumers of Community 1, here T1 = 1.74, and
(c) absolute difference between desired value of utilization and actual utiliza-
tion |xi(K) + yi(K)− T2| of prosumers of Community 2, here T2 = 1.725 and
time index K = 200.
Similar step is used to keep σi,y(k) in the valid probability range.
Now, we analyze the aggregate consumption
∑N
i=1 xi(k) and production∑N
i=1 yi(k) by the prosumer communities. The aggregate consumption
∑N
i=1 xi(k)
is presented in Figure 8(a) for last 40 time instants (days), and similarly, the
aggregate production by the communities
∑N
i=1 yi(k) is shown in Figure 8(b).
Notice that the aggregate prosumption is close to the respective capacity con-
straints Cx and Cy; overshoots and undershoots are due to the assumption
of soft constraints, as described previously. Additionally, Figure 8(c) shows
the time-averaged consumption
∑N
i=1 xi(k) by all prosumers in the prosumer
market until 1000 time instants, and similarly, the time-averaged production
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Fig. 7: (a) Evolution of derivatives of gi(.) w. r. t. x for prosumers of Com-
munity 1, and (b) evolution of derivatives of gi(.) w. r. t. x for prosumers of
Community 2.
∑N
i=1 yi(k) by all prosumers in the prosumer market for the same period, these
averages are approximately equal to the respective capacities, satisfying the
capacity constraints of Problem 1. In addition to the above results, we observe
in Figure 9(a) and 9(b) that most of the time the aggregate consumption∑N
i=1 xi(k) and the aggregate production
∑N
i=1 yi(k) are close to their respec-
tive capacities Cx and Cy. Furthermore, the convergence of feedback signals
Ωx and Ωy are shown in Figure 9(c).
7 Conclusion and Future Directions
We proposed distributed control algorithms to solve regulation problems with
optimality constraints for community-based prosumer market. The algorithm
is based on ideas from stochastic approximation but formulated in a con-
trol theoretic setting. The algorithm reaches optimality asymptotically, while
simultaneously regulating instantaneous contract constraints. To do so, the
algorithm does not require communication between prosumers, but little com-
munication with the sharing platform. Additionally, the algorithm is light and
is suitable to implement in an Internet-of-Things (IoT) context with minimal
demands on infrastructure. Two applications are described and simulation re-
sults presented to demonstrate the efficacy of the algorithms. Future work
will explore the theoretical aspects of the algorithm (convergence properties),
new applications and use cases, and the development of policies to reach more
complicated equilibria.
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